Episode 387 Deep Dive: Dr Ahana Datta Fasel | China Doesn't Want What You Think It Wants

Ahana Datta Fasel [00:00:00]: There's a live operation right now as we speak in US telecom networks that has been attributed to the Chinese, where Chinese hackers have compromised all the major telco companies in the US over the course of 3 years. VO: From KBI.Media, I'm Karissa Breen, and this is KBKast. KB [00:00:25]: My guest today is Ahana Datta Fasel. Author of Full Stack Spies, Ahana has been studying Chinese cyber power through the lens of strategy, not just technology. We talk about how a decade of Five Eyes politics has left the West without a coherent China strategy, the Chinese hackers who have been sitting inside America's phone networks for 3 years, and the question no one can really answer: when does spying become preparation for war? VO: If today's episode lands for you, do 2 things: hit follow and send it to one person in your network who needs to hear it. That's how shows like this grow. KB [00:00:57]: Alrighty, let's get into it. Okay, so Ahana, I want to understand, given your background, your pedigree, your time in this space, when China hacks telecoms or critical infrastructure or private companies, What are they really trying to learn about us exactly? Ahana Datta Fasel [00:01:24]: It's so different depending on the target, and it's so hard to say. And the targets have always been so expansive, and we've had these cyber operations aimed at companies and critical national infrastructure and healthcare in the West over the course of 30 years. So I wish I could say China wants this from us, but it's very difficult to say. To point at one thing. It's very difficult to point at an intention behind a particular cyber operation. So what China tends to do is it will try out successive cyber operations with an increasing degree of boldness, whether that's in its spycraft, whether that's in the criticality of its targeting, or whether that's in the sheer number of targets that it manages to aim towards. But also what's really interesting is that often they don't really want to know anything about us at all. Their intention can veer quite, can oscillate quite dramatically between trying to gain counterintelligence about their own citizens who are in the West or the extended Chinese diaspora that's out in the West that they might want to target. Ahana Datta Fasel [00:02:41]: But they also, want to know what we know about them. So over the past 30 years, their cyber operations have ranged from knowing more and more about our military tech, like aerospace and defense technologies, to how we are doing on COVID, to what the West knows about Chinese officials or Chinese agents who might be operating in the West. and keeping an eye on how far they're getting along, or for dissidents to target and turn towards some kind of a strategic end. So these kind of intentions play out over cyberspace, but there's no single operation that you, that reveals their true strategic intent completely and fully. KB [00:03:29]: Okay. That's interesting because if we look at the mainstream media, I'm just going to say mainstream because obviously I'm more of an independent media and this is specialized media. There is this view, or there's this outward perception that China are on the hunt to know everything about the West, right? So you are saying like it's, they're actually just more intrigued about figuring out what the West know about them. So would you say, given your experience, there's a lot of misalignment on China's view on what they're trying to know about the West? So people will assume that, but then you are saying, no, that's not the case. Has the media really blown this out of proportion to try to tell people that they really are interested and they are trying to gather intelligence on us? Ahana Datta Fasel [00:04:16]: I think it's worth saying that it is really hard to know how to report this in a sensible way, in a fair way that doesn't compromise intelligence operations that are being run by the West or the knowledge that we have about them or the kind of signaling in cyberspace that's happening between the West and China. And to be able to portray that in, as you call it, mainstream media is really hard. To be able to portray that fairly and to be able to capture the nuances of it are really hard. I think partly the reason is that when we find out about a cyber operation that has been attributed to the Chinese, we have in the West this kind of longstanding association between China and intellectual property theft. Or China and tech transfer. And often the case is that it's not quite so clear-cut. And I think to be able to portray that in mainstream media is another challenge entirely. And partly it's kind of the reason why I wrote this book, to be able to look at it over the past 30 years and say, well, there's a pattern here, which is that China doesn't necessarily, you know, sort of do a hit and run. Ahana Datta Fasel [00:05:21]: If it can, it will capitalize on those gains by trying the same kind of spycraft over and over again. In increasingly bold ways. KB [00:05:31]: And would you say that's pretty much what every country's trying to do? Because everyone's sort of trying to deflect and say they're doing this and to get the spotlight off them and trying to potentially throw another country, nation under the bus and say, well, this is their plan because no one really wants to discuss their plan. So it's sort of, at some level, it's sort of like there's a bit of a red herring. Go and focus on that because we don't want you focusing on what we are doing. Would you say that's a bit of the case? And then also, because you are looking at this through your book of the last 30 years, how should people be reporting on this? How can someone like myself be reporting on this properly? Ahana Datta Fasel [00:06:10]: I mean, those are both fantastic questions, right? I think to your first point, everyone spies, and that, that is just a truism. That is just a fact. It's just a fact of life, and it's been a fact of life since the world's second oldest profession has existed. Everyone spies, and cyberspace is simply another medium for them to do so. I think that the difficulty in cyberspace is that it's not always possible through the technical details to tell whether something's a spying operation or was intended to be a spying operation, or whether something was intended to be something a bit more sinister. For example, to breach a network and sit in the network and wait for an opportune moment so that if there are escalating diplomatic tensions between 2 nations, to be able to capitalize on that cybersecurity breach in the case of sort of a real kinetic conflict, that sort of thing. So often the difference between spying and this kind of preparation, these kind of preparatory activities is really hard. And to be able to report on that fairly and not sensationally is even harder. Ahana Datta Fasel [00:07:23]: If you speak to most boards, their eyes, well, used to constantly glaze over when you said the word cyber, because how do you explain that to a group of very senior people who don't necessarily understand the nitty-gritties of it, who can't follow a chart or a line graph and see whether things are improving or not? and don't necessarily understand the consequences of what a breach might mean, and then try and scale that to a regular media audience. So it is extremely hard to be able to report this even without the geopolitics of what one country's doing as opposed to another. But I think what helps now is that because of the sad fact that we have multiple kinetic conflicts happening simultaneously in the world. We are able to see a bit more clearly what states do in the case of these conflicts, whether that's Russia-Ukraine, whether that's US-Iran, and whether that's sort of the building anxiety around Taiwan. We see now more and more that cyber operations have a very sort of complementary effect on kinetic operations to be able to prepare the battlefield for the actual conflict, for the actual combat to take place, whether that's taking out the CCTVs on the streets of Tehran or whether that's trying to disable Ukraine's power grids. Now cyber's kind of inextricable from live conflict. So that helps to set precedence so that we can tell what the purpose of a cyber operation might have been. But it's very difficult to be able to report on this when you have a cyberspace that's muddied with ransomware and that's muddied with low-level breaches that have been generated by AI models. Ahana Datta Fasel [00:09:24]: And so all of that is happening in the same arena all the time. And that makes a lot of this quite sophisticated activity and a lot of low-level activity hard to distinguish. KB [00:09:36]: So I wanna know, based on your reconnaissance in the space of 30 years, would you say geopolitics has gotten worse? Or what I mean by that question is, does it appear worse because 30 years ago we didn't have the proliferation of social media and the everyday person having a viewpoint, and then the, the next person agrees with that everyday viewpoint and Therefore, everyone's got an opinion and everyone can watch stuff constantly. So does it appear that it's getting worse or would you believe it stayed the same, but it's just been publicized more in terms of the form it is today? Ahana Datta Fasel [00:10:17]: I mean, that is a great question. What I will say is that this is a really hard thing to measure. So, you know, how would you know that the level of threat, geopolitical threat, has gone up based on where you are located. You know, for example, I'm in London and over the past 18 months we've had a lot of hullabaloo about our defense investment plan and what the UK's defensive posture is. And are we going to be able to have the kind of capability to build resilience in multiple domains? And what does that look like? And I think what we are seeing is that people are certainly more aware of the kind of threats that 20 years ago before social media would've been really difficult to document and convey in a coherent way. The kind of hybrid attacks that we see that would've been difficult to attribute by any actor outside of the intelligence services. Now we have a trove of open source information that helps us see where these actors are coming from and what kind of techniques they use. It's both geopolitics is becoming more dangerous because the world is becoming a bit more unpredictable because there are several different strategic competitions happening at the same time, whether that's for AI or whether that's towards the various different supply chains that feed this kind of tech boom, but also because we have now ways to be able to see what's happening without getting that information broadcast to us from a single source of authority and to be able to make up our own minds about what that kind of threat looks like in a way that we didn't have before. Ahana Datta Fasel [00:11:58]: So it's both the visibility, but also the unpredictability of geopolitics that are working together to make it feel a bit more unstable. KB [00:12:06]: On that point, has the West been too quick to frame China's cyber activity as aggression? Because again, as going back to how it's being positioned in the market, but then I look at the other side and is it too slow perhaps to ask what their behavior reveals about its own sort of insecurity? So I'm just curious because I'm sort of looking at all the pieces, looking at both sides and just trying to help me make sense of that. Ahana Datta Fasel [00:12:31]: It wouldn't be accurate to say that we have been too slow to label China as anything, but I think what we've been doing is looking at Chinese cyber activity episodically rather than what it says for the Chinese intelligence services and therefore China's foreign policy, China's domestic agenda, and the way that it mobilizes its cyber power and try and see where its cyber operations line up against that backdrop. So it is true that China has become more aggressive in the sense that it has scaled up its operations because its ecosystem is massive. The ecosystem that's able to conduct these offensive cyber operations multiple times is an order of magnitude larger than, for example, we have the capability to do in the UK. But I think it would be remiss of me not to say that we have not just been too slow to see it as aggression, but we've also been Too slow to characterize it fairly. The aggression isn't simply aggression as a show of power or for the sake of landing a message all the time, but it is to test the West's boundaries and to be able to see what we will react to, how we will react, what kind of reactions will stick and what won't work, and how China can develop this sort of ecosystem. that remains exempt from Western reprisals like sanctions or any other kind of sort of indictments on hackers who will never be touched by sort of what the FBI does and what the DOJ does, 'cause they will likely never come to the US or come to the UK. In the past 30 years, there have been less than 5 incidents where a Chinese hacker who was acting on behalf of the state and has participated in an operation that has led to some sort of indictment has been held to account in the West. And the most recent one was a couple of years ago when a hacker, an alleged hacker, was in Italy, presumably on holiday, and was then extradited by the Italians to the US to be able to face charges. Ahana Datta Fasel [00:14:46]: And that was the only time. And if you think about the size of this ecosystem, it's enormous. So to be able to bring balance into this is really hard to do. It's a very different equation based on Are you a US intelligence analyst? Are you based in Australia? Are you in the UK? What is your own posture and what is your government's strategic posture towards China? And without knowing that, you can't really know what kind of red lines you have to be able to characterize something as aggression or undue aggression. KB [00:15:18]: Okay. So many questions that I have that have been coming up in my mind. My first question would be, do you think as well, if you're constantly feeling like attacked, what do people naturally do? Even animals, they start to flare up. They start to be on the front foot. They're a little bit more aggressive back because they constantly feel like they're in danger. Would you say, and I know it's probably not a great example, a country to an animal, but do you think that could be what's happening there? Because it's this constant, I know that we can say Iran and all these other places, sure. But there's always been that trickle about China. So do you think that maybe perhaps their perceived aggression is it's because, well, hang on, we're getting picked on here a lot? Ahana Datta Fasel [00:16:00]: It's really important to call something out here, which is that you are possibly one of the only people I've spoken to who's tried to understand this from China's point of view. And that is really some sign that mainstream media needs to be asking slightly different questions. In answer to the question itself, I mean, more so since President Xi took over almost a couple of decades ago now, but the difference is that China sees everything through the lens of national security. It sees its economic security through the lens of national security. It looks at its domestic ambitions through the lens of national security. It looks at foreign policy through the lens of national security. And I don't necessarily want to, you know, comment on sort of historical events that have led China to develop this sort of psyche. What we see in terms of Xi Jinping putting the Communist Party sort of much closer together to try and centralize the military, to try and streamline the intelligence services, to try and get rid of the endemic corruption in his, in his government time and time again, most recently through successive purging operations and in sort of within the senior military ranks. Ahana Datta Fasel [00:17:18]: We have seen that this is a nation that has only developed its confidence in recent years. And for the longest time has simply been trying in its own mind to justify its domestic ambitions through its foreign policy objectives. ultimately to lift its population out of poverty, to be able to provide it with economic growth, to be able to provide it with housing. And that story up until 2015 to 2018 was China's national story, a story of being a rising power, a story of becoming an increasingly confident challenger. And then at some point around 2019, 2020, that rising challenger posture turned into a confident superpower posture. So if we look at China today, the kind of feeling of being on the back foot and therefore trying to compensate by being more and more aggressive, that posture is changing now. Now China seems more and more confident even to be able to act on par with the US in terms of the sophistication of its cyber operations. Or in terms of being able to parley with the US government on, on common ground. KB [00:18:33]: So Ahana, I wanna know as well, given your experience, would you say in terms of foreign policy, is the West going about it in the right way? Big question, I know. Ahana Datta Fasel [00:18:48]: No, I mean, I wouldn't expect anything less, to be honest. I think that we haven't got our house in order, and I don't think anyone would disagree with that. When I say the West, immediately you have to ask the question, who do I mean when I say the West? We all have such incongruous and disparate postures towards China that it's difficult to be able to say that there is a collective stance that the West has, and a stance that has remained consistent over the past 10 years is nearly impossible. If you think about the UK, and the mid-2010s when the UK was courting Chinese investment with arms wide open, only up until the case with installing Huawei's 5G infrastructure on the UK network and having that backlash from the Americans. Up until that point, the UK's strategic posture towards China wasn't a very hawkish one. The UK was pretty vocal about being able to balance the competitive stance with a cooperative one. But in the US, that has changed a lot, a lot more dramatically. If you think about the first Trump term and all the rhetoric about China, and if you think about 10 years later when Presidents Trump and Xi meet up and in the background, some of the cyber sanctions on Chinese actors are relaxed so that the meeting can go ahead without a hitch. Ahana Datta Fasel [00:20:14]: That is a very different posture that the US has taken and has evolved over the past 10 years. It's not an antagonistic posture. It's not an adversarial posture. It's just that the posture isn't very clear. So I think to say that the West's foreign policy towards China has been mixed, I think it's right. And I think that is probably going to be the case because we are now so intertwined with Chinese infrastructure and Chinese tech. Whether you're looking at what the Europeans are doing to try and bring themselves out of this through a sovereignty framework, or whether you look at the US that's not being terribly vocal about antagonizing a more confident China, the West is certainly not following a coherent strategy. And I think that is probably going to be the new norm where Western countries will each have their own relationship with China that remains to be articulated. KB [00:21:14]: And do you envision that that relationship with China will be more independent? Because from what I'm hearing, it sounds like US is perhaps dominant in their thinking in the sense of, to your Huawei example, if US didn't say something, perhaps it would've been rolled out. Same happened in Australia. When Mr. Turnbull, and I actually interviewed him about this, made his decision to not go ahead with the rollout with Huawei. That is interesting. And the reason why it's interesting is because Five Eyes countries, and you've obviously gotta protect that, and we're allied countries. So how does that dynamic work? Because US is very big military force. They're a very big player, so it would probably wouldn't be smart. KB [00:21:57]: to be like, well, we've heard what you said, US, but we're going to do our own thing, which could jeopardize other relationships, etc. So how do you believe countries are going to navigate that while still being allied, still having that relationship, but also perhaps taking more of an independent view on how each country wants to deal with China? Ahana Datta Fasel [00:22:15]: The short answer would be I hope that they do so more gracefully than they have so far. And the slightly longer answer is that In real terms, the intelligence relationship between the Five Eyes, despite all the political rhetoric, remains unchanged. And there's a reason for that. As you say, the US is an intelligence superpower and most other Western nations are consumers of this, these intelligence products. To be able to have this kind of leverage over the rest of the Five Eyes allows the US to be able to achieve its foreign policy objectives. Australia was ahead of us in banning the 5G infrastructure, far ahead of the UK. But I think the point that we are at now, it's crazy, but it's 6 years later after the 5G discussion. So over half a decade later, where we are now is that we do recognize that being entrenched too deeply with Chinese tech has not served a lot of Europe, and we need to find a way to balance that relationship without necessarily antagonizing the US. Ahana Datta Fasel [00:23:23]: So beyond all the political rhetoric, I mean, I wrote about this recently in an article that unless the EU has sovereignty in terms of how it acts on its intelligence and strategic posture, its ambitions to become technologically sovereign are largely empty. In that sense, While we would really rather continue being closely allied on the intelligence front with the US, the realpolitik of being able to use and continue using Chinese tech and Chinese infrastructure will be an interesting one to manage. And it'll certainly be a far more interesting one to manage with other middle powers who are not in the Five Eyes and how our relationships play out with them. So it's certainly going to be a more transactional thinking and a transactional world. But I think at the moment, what middle powers generally, but also the junior partners of the Five Eyes are hoping for, and I don't think this is anything too controversial to say, is some level of stability and some level of predictability and to be able to have the tools to navigate in a world where these things are not a given anymore. And for that, it will need to be able to bank on its close relationship with the US because US security has underwritten our security since the Second World War. KB [00:24:44]: We'll come back to that in just a moment after a quick word from our sponsor. Selling SaaS to enterprise? You'll be asked about your security credentials sooner or later, likely before the contract's even signed. Vanta helps SaaS teams prove their compliance in frameworks like ISO 27001 and SOC 2 without losing months to manual prep. Visit vanta.com/kbcast. That's vanta.com/kbcast to learn more. So at what point would you say does a cyber espionage stop being spying and become preparation for war? Now, I asked this question because as we all know, the new sort of frontier of war is starting with cyber war that leads into kinetic war. We've seen that in the Russia-Ukraine situation. KB [00:25:39]: We're seeing it in other things across the world. We're probably going to continue to see it. So who do you think gets to make the call before it's too late, for example? Ahana Datta Fasel [00:25:51]: That is really one of the questions, the cutting edge of modern conflict. If you think about Russia-Ukraine, US-Iran, if you even think about Russia's incursions into sort of smaller powers or its information operations, if you think about China's cognitive warfare operations, as it likes to think about them, these operations are not often so distinguishable from espionage. There's a live operation right now as we speak in US telecom networks that has been attributed to the Chinese, where Chinese hackers have compromised all the major telco companies in the US over the course of 3 years, and they've been sitting on those networks for 3 years and they haven't done anything. They're just capturing all the metadata that these companies handle. We don't know if they're looking for something in particular and it just happens to be there, but what could possibly be the intention behind this? And there are several ways to look at it depending on who you are. So for example, a very parochial way of looking at it would be when China found out about Edward Snowden's revelations and realized US capability over passive surveillance, it wanted a rival capability. to be able to do the same. And since then, it has launched much smaller in scale, but cyber operations on telco networks that intercept US mobile traffic. Ahana Datta Fasel [00:27:20]: And this is essentially a culmination of those attempts. So that is one theory. That is one way to look at this. Another way to look at this is that an increasingly emboldened China no longer denies as vehemently as it used to its culpability in terms of its cyber operations, that it doesn't often, it doesn't feel the need to evade reprisals anymore. And so this is simply the latest quid pro quo. You spy on us, we spy on you. The third theory is that this is again a massive counterintelligence operation to be able to know what the US is doing and to be able to track a lot of this metadata to be able to filter out what, if, who it suspects to be double agents operating on American soil. So even now, just sort of sitting here from an objective perspective, I've given you 3 different possibilities of what it could be. Ahana Datta Fasel [00:28:17]: And now imagine that the US and China are in some sort of proxy conflict in Taiwan, which I think increasingly analysts are beginning to consider might not be a possible outcome over the next 2 to 3 years. But say we got to that possibility, being inside telco networks will give China the ability to essentially cut off public comms, to be able to receive emergency alerts, to be able to contact and make phone calls between, between citizens, but also internationally. So it sits on this massive flashpoint, but so far for the past 3 years, it hasn't shown any intent of doing anything about it. It's really difficult to say when what looks like espionage might be in truth conflict preparation or might become conflict preparation as tensions worsen. KB [00:29:12]: So what do you think analysts are sort of predicting then? What are some of the chatter that's going on there? Ahana Datta Fasel [00:29:17]: What is likely to happen? I mean, the kind of group behind this particular operation is a patchwork of different Chinese hacking groups, and analysts don't necessarily have a coherent view on what this campaign means. And this campaign is just, I suppose, the most recent iteration of what China's doing in cyberspace. And it feels the most egregious because of just the sheer scale of what the Chinese have managed to compromise. But if you look at commentary from when this operation was first discovered a couple of years ago, there were respectable analysts who were framing this as just the latest and heightened form of aggression. But the truth is that if we were to look further back over the course of 30 years, the Chinese have done this again and again, each time with a slightly more ambitious target or a slightly more, you know, just sort of pushing the boundary a bit further just to see what they, what they can get away with. So the decision, of course, will eventually be made and will have to be made by the National Security Council. As of a year ago, that operation spread out from US telco networks into the communication systems of the US Congress. And the closest parallel that I can think about is Russia's cyber activities over the past 20 years. Ahana Datta Fasel [00:30:43]: One of the most common questions I get asked in my role as a strategic advisor is when is a cyber operation an act of war? And if you think about how we've been allowing the boundary of what constitutes an act of war to be pushed ever so slightly further and further over the past 20 years, whether that's beginning with Russia taking out Estonia's power grids in 2007 to the successive cyberattacks on Ukraine, to its cyberattacks in preparation for annexing Crimea or Georgia, or over the past 20 years, each kinetic operation has had a litany of cyber operations that are direct and also indirect. And we have let that boundary, that red line, be breached every time and told ourselves that cyber operations in and of themselves are not an act of aggression because they haven't directly caused any deaths. They haven't directly caused anything that might constitute an act of war, whether that's launching ransomware on our healthcare systems and preventing ambulances from being able to operate, or whether that's— Holding private companies, holding supply chain, key supply chain actors to ransom and preventing any sort of level of service across the supply chain. For example, in shipping, and this was 10 years ago. And successively, the Russians have pushed our boundaries and pushed our thinking of what constitutes an act of war. And there is no reason to think that the Chinese haven't learned from that, haven't observed that. What the Chinese military did in the, in a bunch of American naval bases in the Pacific around the island of Guam, they were trying to essentially infiltrate a bunch of naval logistics bases that belonged to the US, that in the event an incensed Biden administration would do something over Taiwan that was unacceptable to China's red lines, that they would have the ability to monitor naval movements in real time and to be able to prepare their own ground to be able to react decisively. Ahana Datta Fasel [00:32:58]: So that was an operation that looked like espionage, but was actually preparation for something more grave. And these kinds of incursions in cyberspace are really difficult to pin down as potential acts of war or essentially an insurance policy for for countries as they try and position themselves in a place to have bigger and bigger bargaining chips. I'm sure that if you were to ask someone in the Chinese military what their intention was, they would have a very different analysis of what the significance of this operation was, and they might be able to give us a completely different perspective. And if you were to ask someone in Australia, they would have a completely different perspective on this as well. So it is never so clear-cut now. And I think that is what is fueling our instability, this feeling of instability, this feeling of unpredictability. And cyberspace, which is inherently such an ambiguous domain, when warfare plays out over cyberspace, the consequences are even more unpredictable. KB [00:33:59]: So, Ahana, final question. We've talked about a lot of things, covered a lot of terrain. What would be some of your predictions perhaps in the next 12 months, 24 months? What do you think given your lineage and with the book that you've written, what can we expect? Ahana Datta Fasel [00:34:18]: In terms of cyberspace itself, cyberspace is changing quite fundamentally because of how easier it will get and how quicker it will get to launch a cyberattack thanks to the use of AI. And that disparity between the computer time of exploiting a target and the human time where we have to respond and patch and make political decisions, as that gap gets wider and wider, cyberspace will become an arena where this sort of instability will play out much more starkly, even barring any new kinetic conflicts. That means an arena where the conflict isn't just getting more unstable and more unpredictable in terms of volume, but also in terms of the strategic importance, the contribution to a hybrid campaign. And what I mean by that is that here in Europe, we have seen a rise in hybrid activity often attributed to Russia. And there has been a step change in that. in the past 2 years and currently even more so as the domestic situation in Russia looks precarious. So the use of this unstable, unpredictable, high-volume, easy-to-replicate offensive activity, this new shifting cyberspace will become much more intrinsic to nations as they try and achieve their objectives in both the foreign policy space, but also on the battlefield itself. So cyberspace itself in for an unpredictable, and I mean this, quite a wild ride in terms of how easy it'll be for attacks to be launched without quite enough time for us to get ahead of them. KB [00:36:13]: That was Ahana, everybody. The thing that really rattles me is that Chinese hackers have been sitting inside America's major telecom networks for 3 years and still haven't done anything with it, and how quietly the line between spying and preparing for war keeps moving. If you want to go deeper on how China's cyber playbook has evolved over 30 years, Ahana's new book, Full Stack Spies: Cyber Espionage in the Age of US-China Competition, is out now. Link is in the show notes. VO: I read every reply. If you've got some thoughts on this one, send me a message on LinkedIn. KBKast - Cyber for the C-suite.